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We study the role of social long term care (LTC) insurance when income taxation and private 
insurance markets are imperfect. Policy instruments include public provision of LTC as well 
as a subsidy on private insurance. The subsidy scheme may be linear or nonlinear. For the 
linear part we consider a continuous distribution of types, characterized by earnings and 
survival probabilities. In the nonlinear part, society consists of three types: poor, middle class 
and rich. The first type is too poor to provide for dependence; the middle class type purchases 
private insurance and the high income type is self-insured. The main questions are at what 
level LTC should be provided to the poor and whether it is desirable to subsidize private LTC 
for the middle class. Interestingly, the results are similar under both linear and nonlinear 
schemes. First, in both cases, a (marginal) subsidy of private LTC insurance is not desirable. 
As a matter of fact, private insurance purchases should typically be taxed (at least at the 
margin). Second, the desirability of public provision of LTC services depends on the way the 
income tax is restricted. In the linear case, it may be desirable only if no demogrant (uniform 
lump-sum transfer) is available. In the nonlinear case, public provision is desirable when the 
income tax is sufficiently restricted. Specifically, this is the case when the income is subject 
only to a proportional payroll tax while the LTC reimbursement policy can be nonlinear. 
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April 2011 1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that one of the main rationales for social insurance is redistrib-
ution. The basic argument goes back to Rochet (1991) who shows that social insurance
may be an e⁄ective way to supplement an optimal income tax; see also Cremer and
Pestieau (1996). Roughly speaking, the intuition is the following. Consider an actu-
arially fair private insurance and introduce the possibility of a social insurance scheme
which o⁄ers coverage at a uniform rate (irrespective of the individual risk). If there
were no tax distortion the optimal policy would be to redistribute resources through
income taxation, and to let individuals purchase the private insurance that ￿ts their
needs. If there are tax distortions, and if the probability of loss is inversely correlated
with earnings, then social insurance becomes desirable.
While the above proposition applies to a number of life-cycle risks, it does not apply
to risks which are positively correlated to earnings, as is typically the case for long
term care. Dependence is known to increase with longevity and longevity with income;
consequently the need for LTC is positively correlated with income. Consequently,
Rochet￿ s argument implies that social LTC insurance would not be desirable.
However, Rochet￿ s argument also relies on a number of otherwise strong assumptions.
In reality income taxation is not optimal. Furthermore, private LTC insurance is far
from being actuarially fair. Loading costs are high and individuals may prefer not to
buy insurance. Low income individuals will rely on family solidarity or social assistance
and high income individuals on ￿self-insurance￿(i.e., ￿nance their LTC expense from
their accumulated savings).
In this paper we study the role of social LTC insurance in a setting inspired by
Rochet (1991), but amended to account for the imperfection of income taxation and
private insurance markets. Policy instruments include public provision of LTC as well
as a subsidy on private insurance. The subsidy scheme may be linear or nonlinear. For
the nonlinear part, we will look at a society made of three types: poor, middle class
1and rich. The ￿rst type is too poor to provide for dependence; the middle class type
purchases private insurance and the high income type is self-insured. Two of the main
questions are then at what level LTC should be provided to the poor and whether it
is desirable to subsidize private LTC for the middle class. Interestingly, the results are
similar under both linear and nonlinear schemes. First, in both cases, a (marginal)
subsidy of private LTC insurance is not desirable. As a matter of fact, private insurance
purchases should typically be taxed (at least at the margin). Second, the desirability
of public provision of LTC services depends on the way the income tax is restricted. In
the linear case, it may be desirable only if no demogrant (uniform lump-sum transfer)
is available. In the nonlinear case, public provision is desirable when the income tax
is su¢ ciently restricted. Speci￿cally, this is the case when income is subject only to a
proportional payroll tax while the LTC reimbursement policy can be nonlinear.
There exist very few studies which have addressed the issue of social insurance for
LTC. Jousten et al. (2005) focus on families with di⁄erent levels of altruism. Given the
cost of public funds, the central planner tries to induce the more altruistic families to
assist their dependent parents and to restrict aid to the dependent elderly whose children
are less altruistic. This may imply a suboptimal quality of public LTC, compared to
the ￿rst-best level. Pestieau and Sato (2008) study the problem of evenly altruistic
children who di⁄er in their earning capacities, that is in their wages and thus in the
opportunity cost of the time spent assisting their dependent parents. In case of parent￿ s
dependency, the more productive children tend to provide ￿nancial help whereas the
less productive children o⁄er their time. Parents who have su¢ ciently large pensions or
other resources and who do not expect enough assistance from their children purchase
some private insurance. The social welfare maximizing government can subsidize family
assistance and/or private insurance. It can also directly provide nursing services. The
appropriate policy is shown to depend on the loading cost of private insurance, the cost
of public funds and the wealth of the parents. Finally, Pestieau and Sato (2010) consider
2a society segmented into altruistic and non altruistic families and also into poor and
rich families. Private insurance is available and the role of the government is restricted
to a nonlinear tax/subsidy of the insurance premiums. Insurance companies provide a
lump-sum reimbursement that is not equal to actual costs incurred but to an average
value of these costs. They study the shape of this nonlinear subsidy in a setting where
neither incomes nor altruism are observable by the social planner. The main result is
that asymmetric information implies marginal taxation of all types of households but
the top one in terms of self selection constraints.
2 Linear scheme
Consider a two period model where individuals work and save in the ￿rst period. In-
dividuals di⁄er in their wage (earning ability) w. Their probability to be alive in the
second period is ’; this probability may be positively correlated with earning ability. In
their second period individuals face a probability ￿ (assumed to be uniform) of becoming
dependent. An individual￿ s expected utility is given by
u(x) + ’(1 ￿ ￿)u(d) + ’￿H(m);
where x = c ￿ ‘2=2 denotes the ￿rst period consumption, c; net of the (quadratic)
disutility of labor ‘; d represents second period consumption, while m denotes total
expenditures in case of dependency. Wage is denoted by w and pretax (￿rst-period)
income is given by w‘. Private saving, s, is invested in a perfect annuity market and,
with a zero interest rate, its return is s=’. The functions u and H are strictly increasing
and strictly concave. We assume that u(x) > H(x) to re￿ ect that dependence implies
costly needs. The following additional assumption is used for some arguments below.
Assumption 1 The degree of relative risk aversion associated with u is smaller than








32.1 Social LTC bene￿ts
With the linear scheme considered in this section, a (uniform) social LTC bene￿t, g,
and a demogrant a are ￿nanced by a proportional tax on wage income at rate ￿. We
thus have
u(x) = u[w‘(1 ￿ ￿) + a ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘2=2]
such that ‘ = w(1 ￿ ￿) and hence u(x) = u[w2(1 ￿ ￿)2=2 + a ￿ s ￿ ￿]; where ￿ is the
payment for private LTC insurance.
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The associated bene￿ts (paid in case of dependency) are given by ￿￿p=’￿ where ￿p is
the (private insurance) loading factor. The corresponding ￿rst-order condition are
￿ u0(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(s=’) + ￿H0(s=’ + g + ￿￿p=’￿) = 0
￿ u0(x) + ￿pH0(s=’ + g + ￿￿p=’￿) = 0
We now study the optimal linear policy that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare
function. We assume a discrete wage distribution, and denote by ni the number (pro-
portion) of individuals who have wage wi and survival probability ’i. Total population
size is normalized at one so that
P
i ni = 1. The Lagrangian expression associated with
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where ￿ is the multiplier of the budget constraint.
Using the expectation operator E, the ￿rst-order conditions are1
1P
i nixi = Ex
4￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Eu0(x)w2 + ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)Ew2 = 0
Eu0(x) ￿ ￿ = 0
@$
@g
= ￿E’H0(m) ￿ ￿￿E’
To state these conditions we have assumed an interior solution for ￿ and a, but we do
not rule out a corner solution for g. Rearranging these expression we have


















+ (1 ￿ ￿p)E’Eu0(x)
￿
:
As the covariance between longevity and productivity is positive we have that
cov(’;u0(x)) < 0 and if the private loading factor is close to one, social insurance
is clearly not welfare improving. This can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that a linear income tax is used to ￿nance a demogrant and
a LTC ￿at rate bene￿t. Suppose further that LTC private insurance loading factor
is not much lower than one. Suppose also that the survival probability and thus the
probability of dependence increases with income. Then a LTC social insurance is socially
undesirable.
Let us now assume that there is no demogrant. In other words we take the distri-

























cov(u0(x);’)Ew2 ￿ cov(u0(x);w2)￿ ’￿p
￿
:



























In this new expression the variables have been normalized in such a way that the two
covariances are now comparable. given the above assumptions those two covariances
are negative and we can thus expect that the RHS of (2) is positive if the variance of
w is higher than that of ’. In other words if income inequality dominates longevity
inequalities LTC social insurance becomes socially desirable.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a payroll tax is used to ￿nance a LTC ￿at rate bene￿t.
Suppose further that LTC private insurance loading factor is equal (or very close to)
unity. Suppose ￿nally that the survival probability and thus the probability of depen-
dence increases with income. Then a LTC social insurance is desirable if the covariance
between marginal utilities and the square of wages is in absolute value higher that the
covariance between the marginal utilities and survival probabilities (after normalization
of these variables).
2.2 Social LTC bene￿ts and subsidy of private insurance
Let us now assume that besides providing LTC bene￿ts the government can also subsi-
dize the purchase of private insurance. Denoting the subsidy rate by ￿; the Lagrangian






i=2 ￿ si ￿ ￿i(1 ￿ ￿) + a
￿
+ ’i(1 ￿ ￿)u(si=’i)
+ ￿H(si=’i + g + ￿i￿p=’i￿) + ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)w2
i ￿ a ￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿’ig
￿
6Observe that like in the previous sub-section we start with the case where a demogrant
a is available. The FOC with respect to ￿ is
@$
@￿







Assuming an interior solution and combining this expression with the FOC with respect






In the presence of a distributive demogrant and given the fact that ￿ is a normal good,
it is socially desirable to tax ￿ to ￿nance a. This is in line with the results obtained by
Sato and Pestieau (2010) who also ￿nd a negative subsidy. Recall that in a setting where
the demogrant is available, it is likely that g = 0; see Proposition 1. In other words,
the government intervention is limited to redistributing disposable income so that low
productivity households can buy more goods, including private LTC insurance coverage.
Given that LTC purchase increases with earnings, they are also taxed. Remember that
￿ increases with w because it is a normal good but also because the probability of
dependence increases with w.
Naturally this formula for ￿ only holds if there is a demogrant. In the case such a










































Observe that insurance purchases ￿ are related to x through two channels: because it
is a normal good and because longevity increases with earnings. Consequently, we can
indeed expect that
￿ ￿cov(u0(x);￿=￿ ￿)








7In words, one should expect a tax (negative subsidy) on private insurance. This is
intuitive; from a redistributive viewpoint providing g to the households belonging to
the bottom of the income distribution is more desirable than granting them a subsidy
￿￿ that increases with w.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the government LTC policy comprises a ￿at bene￿t and
a subsidy on the purchase of private insurance, both being ￿nanced by a linear earnings
tax. Under reasonable assumptions private insurance should not be subsidized but taxed.
3 Nonlinear scheme
The linear schemes studied so far have known limits. For example, one might object
to the idea of o⁄ering a ￿ at bene￿t to all households even the wealthiest. It is quite
clear that this is hard to defend, except for reasons of political sustainability. In this
section we introduce nonlinear tools that would allow for self-selecting individuals, thus
avoiding that such bene￿t go to everyone even to those who can a⁄ord either insurance
or self-insurance. Given the analytical di¢ culty of the problem at hand we consider a
setting with three income classes indexed i = 1;2;3 so that w1 < w2 < w3. The ￿rst
class consist of low income people who are constrained in their ￿rst period consumption
and their saving. The middle class can save and purchase some LTC insurance. The
high-income class people does not buy LTC insurance; they prefer self-insurance due to
too high loading costs of insurance. The only way to help the poor is to provide them
with some public bene￿t that is not compatible with other type of bene￿ts (e.g., a slot in
a nursing home). The middle class individual can thus be deterred from mimicking the
poor if the social bene￿t is less attractive than the private bene￿t minus the insurance
premium. Moreover, the government can subsidize the purchase of private insurance
by the middle-class but in a way that does not induce the rich to prefer mimicking the
middle class rather than to self-insure. Given that we focus on LTC and not on the
tax system we assume that the LTC policy is ￿nanced by a proportional tax on type
82 and 3 earnings. For simplicity we assume that all individuals have the same survival
probability so that ’1 = ’2 = ’3 = ’.
3.1 Individual choice and laissez-faire






















where ￿(￿) is the nonlinear subsidy (or tax when it is negative) on private LTC insurance.
Assuming an interior solution for s, we have
@U(w)
@s





















An interior solution for ￿ requires
@U(w)
@￿
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿0)u0(x) + ￿pH0(m) = 0;
which can be rearranged as




where MRS = H0(m)=u0(x) is the marginal rate of substitution between x and m. To
obtain the laissez-faire it is su¢ cient to set ￿ = ￿ = 0 in these expressions.
The following lemma is useful to determine the demand for private LTC insurance
in the laissez-faire.
Lemma 1 (i) When ￿p ￿ ￿ no private insurance will be bought in the laissez faire.
(ii) Let e ￿p(w) denote the critical level of the loading factor such that an individual with
9wage w chooses in the laissez-faire a strictly positive level of private insurance if an only
if ￿p > e ￿p(w). Under Assumption 1, e ￿p increases with w.
Proof. With ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0, the utility of an individual with wage w is
U(w) = u(w(1 ￿ ￿)=2 ￿ s ￿ ￿) + ￿’H(s=’ + ￿￿p=￿’) + (1 ￿ ￿)’u(s=’);







= ￿u0(x) + ￿pH0(s=’)











When ￿p ￿ ￿, the RHS of (5) is negative which establishes part (i) of the lemma. To
establish part (ii) de￿ne e ￿p such that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)u0(s=’) +
￿
e ￿p ￿ ￿
￿
H0(s=’) = 0 (6)
Observe that with (6) depends on w only indirectly, through s which in turn is an increas-































Using (6) to simplify the ￿rst term in bracket, rearranging and using the de￿nition









which establishes part (ii).
10The ￿rst part of this lemma is not surprising. When ￿p=￿ < 1 the LTC insurance
payment, ￿p=￿’ , in case of dependency is less than the return to savings, 1=’. Conse-
quently, private insurance is dominated by savings. Part ii) of the lemma tells us that
for higher levels of the loading factor (￿ < ￿p < 1), richer individuals are more likely
to self-insure. More precisely we can have an equilibrium where type 2 individuals buy
private insurance while type 3 persons don￿ t, but the opposite pattern is not possible.
4 Optimal policy
We now turn to the problem of the utilitarian social planner concentrating on the
case where rich individuals self-insure. The Lagrangian expression associated with this
problem is given by
L = n1
￿
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where ￿ x1and ￿ s1 are given.
11The FOC￿ s are









￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)w2
2
￿
u0(x2) ￿ u0(~ x2)
￿
￿ ￿3(1 ￿ ￿)w2
3
￿
u0(x3) ￿ u0(~ x3)
￿
= 0; (8)






u0(e x3) = 0; (9)




















￿’H0(~ m2) = 0: (11)
4.1 Full information optimum
The true ￿rst-best, that is the utilitarian allocation achieved with full control of quan-
tities and full information (and no loading factors) would imply
u0(xi) = u0(di) for i = 1;2;3 and H0(m1) = H0(m2) = H0(m3): (12)
These conditions do not come as a surprise. On the one hand, they imply that the MRS
between m and x of all individuals is equal to 1 so that there is full insurance. This
condition holds of course for all Pareto-e¢ cient allocations and not just for the utilitarian
solution. On the other hand, condition (12) means that there is full redistribution across
income classes. This property is speci￿c to the utilitarian solution.
For our purpose it is more instructive to consider the full information solution that
one obtains when policy tools are limited in the same way as in our second-best solution.
In other words, the problem is the same as stated in (7), except that individual types
are observable so that incentive constraints are not relevant and ￿2 = ￿3 = 0: The FOCs
12can then be rewritten as follows









￿2 :u0(x2) ￿ ￿ = 0;






Summarizing these results we obtain
u0(x2) = ￿pH0(m2) = H0(m1) = ￿: (13)
The marginal rate of substitution between m and x is now higher than one; because of
the loading factors there is less than full insurance. Individuals of type 3 choose self-
insurance. So doing they oversave and do not consume as much LTC as they would do
with fair private insurance. Their choice of saving is indeed determined by the following
FOC
u0(x3) = (1 ￿ ￿)u0(d3) + ￿H0(m3):
Furthermore in this constrained optimum, one has a limited redistribution between
income classes. Individuals of type 1 keep their low level of consumption; they just
bene￿t from the bene￿t g. Both types 2 and 3 contribute to ￿nancing this bene￿t. In
other words, income inequality is unchanged. What the LTC optimal policy achieves is
an equalization of the mi￿ s, namely the LTC spending.
u0(x1) > u0(x2) > u0(x3):
134.2 Second best with n3 = 0
To facilitate the exposition of the results we ￿rst focus on the case where we only have
individuals of types 1 and 2. In these circumstances case the FOC￿ s can be rewritten as
￿ : ￿(1 ￿ ￿)u0(x2)w2







u0(x2) ￿ u0(~ x2)
￿
= 0


















H0(e m2) = 0
Combining these conditions yields














Combining (4) and (14) we obtain ￿0
2 = 0; there is no marginal tax or subsidy on the
purchases of private LTC insurance. Put di⁄erently, the asymmetric information on
types here does not introduce a distortion on private LTC insurance. This is simply the
traditional ￿no distortion at the top￿property. Observe that no distortion here has to
be understood as no extra distortion (compared to the full-information outcome); we do
have a distortion associated with the loading factor. Condition (15) is best interpreted
with reference to (13). Comparing these two expressions shows that g1, the level of
LTC provided in kind (and for free) is distorted downward. In other words, it is set at
a lower level than under full information. This is done to relax the incentive constraint
of type 2.
4.3 Second best with n3 > 0
The FOC with respect to g1 is not in￿ uenced by the presence of type 3 individuals.
Consequently, expression (15) continues to describe the tradeo⁄for public LTC bene￿ts
14and the results discussed in the previous are not modi￿ed. However, the policy applied


































where ^ MRS3 = H(e m3)=u0(e x3) is the marginal rate of substitution of an individual of
type 3 mimicking and individual of type 2. Observe that the RHS of (16) increases with
the ratio ^ MRS3=MRS2 and is equal to one when ^ MRS3=MRS2. Using (4) we then
obtain that
￿0
2 S 0 , ^ MRS3 T MRS2:
As m is a normal good, we have ^ MRS3 > MRS2 so that there is a marginal tax
on private LTC insurance: ￿0
2 < 0. This is consistent with optimal taxation theory and
to the ￿ndings of the previous section. Note that a marginal tax does not preclude
an overall subsidy, namely ￿2 > 0. In other words, type 2 individuals receives cash
transfers from which they can buy LTC insurance, but the transfer is not conditional on
￿; it is e⁄ectively a lump-sum transfer. Recall that the income tax is restricted and the
lump-sum transfer is used to replicated the optimal nonlinear tax as best as possible.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a three-class society in which in the Laissez-Faire is as fol-
lows: the poor cannot a⁄ord private LTC insurance, the middle class purchases such
insurance and the rich self-insure. An optimal nonlinear social insurance for LTC con-
sists of a social bene￿t targeted towards the poor and a marginal tax (possibly along with
an overall subsidy) on the purchase of private insurance by the middle class.
155 Conclusion.
This paper was concerned by the design of a social insurance for LTC when a private
LTC is available and when the objective of the government is to maximize a utilitarian
social welfare. We distinguished between a linear and a nonlinear scheme. With a linear
scheme it is optimal to provide a ￿ at LTC bene￿t to everyone along with a tax on the
purchase of private insurance. With a nonlinear scheme, we are able to target the LTC
social bene￿t to the bottom of the income distribution. The middle class is subject to
both a marginal tax and an overall subsidy for their purchase of private LTC insurance.
So doing, the top income earners are prevented from mimicking the middle class and
keep self-insuring.
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